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DDCI's Speech to the National Senior CRYPTOLOGIC COURSE 26 April 1968

GENERAL CARTER, MEMBERS OF THE FACULTY AND STU-DENTS OF THE NATIONAL SENIOR CRYPTOLOGIC COURSE, AND FRIENDS:

WHEN GENERAL CARTER INVITED ME TO ADDRESS YOU TODAY, HE SUGGESTED THAT I DISCUSS "TRENDS IN INTELLIGENCE." Now, THIS IS A PRETTY BROAD TOPIC, AND THE PROBLEM OF IDENTIFYING THE MORE IMPORTANT AND PERSISTENT TRENDS REMINDS ME OF THE DILEMMA OF A YOUNG ARAB PRINCE. ON HIS TWENTY-FIRST BIRTHDAY HIS FATHER, THE RULER OF AN OIL-RICH SHEIKDOM, GAVE THE BOY A HAREM--JUST A STARTER KIT OF 50 GIRLS OR SO.

THE NEXT DAY, AN ENVIOUS FRIEND WAS AMAZED TO FIND THE SHEIK'S SON IN A COFFEE HOUSE AT THE LOCAL BAZAAR, SITTING ALONE AND DRINKING LISTLESSLY.

"WHY ARE YOU HANGING AROUND HERE?" THE FRIEND ASKED. "WITH ALL THOSE LOVELY, LONELY GIRLS WAITING FOR YOU, DON'T YOU KNOW WHAT TO DO?"

"I KNOW WHAT TO DO," THE SHEIK'S SON ANSWERED,
"I JUST DON'T KNOW WHERE TO START!"

AND SO IT IS WITH "TRENDS IN INTELLIGENCE." THE TOPIC IS CERTAINLY MORE OPEN TO A SUBJECTIVE INTER-PRETATION, AND A SHEIK'S CHOICE OF SUBJECTS, THAN

IS THE MATERIAL WHICH THE MEMBERS OF THIS COURSE HAVE COVERED DURING THE PAST EIGHT WEEKS. BUT IT IS, I BELIEVE, MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE WHO ARE ENGAGED IN INTELLIGENCE WORK TAKE TIME OUT OCCASIONALLY, STAND BACK FROM OUR DAY-TO-DAY PROBLEMS, AND ASSESS WHERE WE STAND AND IN WHAT DIRECTION WE ARE MOVING. ONLY IF WE DO TAKE STOCK AT REGULAR INTERVALS, CAN WE CHART A COURSE FOR OURSELVES, INSTEAD OF MERELY REACTING TO AND KEEPING PACE WITH THE PRESSURES AND PROBLEMS THAT AFFECT US ALL.

SO LET ME TRY TO IDENTIFY FOR YOU SEVERAL OF THE TRENDS WHICH STRIKE ME AS HAVING A PERSISTENT INFLUENCE UPON OUR BUSINESS.

I BELIEVE WE SHOULD PUT AT THE TOP OF THIS LIST THE GROWING PROBLEM OF GEOGRAPHICAL ACCESS. AS THE COLD WAR HAS THAWED OUT MORE AND MORE IN THE 1960'S, OUR BASES ON FOREIGN SOIL, INCLUDING INTELLIGENCE FACILITIES, HAVE BECOME LESS WELCOME GUESTS. A DECADE AGO, THE AMERICAN PRESENCE SERVED AS A RE-ASSURING SYMBOL OF SECURITY TO THE HOST GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES. NOW OUR PRESENCE, PARTICULARLY FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES, IS BEING EXPLOITED BY COMMUNIST PROPAGANDISTS AND NATIONALIST AGITATORS IN THEIR EFFORTS TO PORTRAY "IMPERIALIST" OR "COLONIALIST" DOMINATION.

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CLEARLY WE ARE UNDER INCREASING PRESSURES TO
WITHDRAW OR REDUCE.

LAR INSIGHT IS REQUIRED TO SEE THAT WE WILL GENERALLY FIND IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO SECURE ACCESS TO AND USE THE REAL ESTATE OF COUNTRIES BORDERING THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC. As a consequence, we must de-

VELOP ALTERNATIVES.

ANOTHER TYPE OF SUBSTITUTE, IN PLACES WHERE WE CAN STILL GET A FOOT IN THE DOOR, IS THE MORE EFFICIENT AND LESS CONSPICUOUS INSTALLATION WHICH CAN BE OPERATED BY FEWER PERSONNEL.

This trend applies, not only to the facilities of the cryptologic agencies, but to those operated by other parts of the Intelligence Community as well. In some countries CIA has experienced a change in what we call "the operational environment." A good "operational environment" is one where local security and police forces cooperate with us, or at least close their eyes to our intelligence operations against the territory or facilities of our targets. Needless to say, their attitude is often a critical

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FACTOR IN MOUNTING CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS. THE

CHANGE THAT I ALLUDED TO CONCERNS CERTAIN COUNTRIES

WHERE COOPERATION HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN OR THE ATTITUDE

HAS BECOME HOSTILE. I GIVE YOU

AS CURRENT EXAMPLES.

THIS SHIFT IN ATTITUDE TOWARD OUR FACILITIES AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IS ALSO PART OF A HEIGHTENED SENSITIVITY, ABROAD AS WELL AS IN THE UNITED STATES, TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. PART OF THIS AWARENESS AND HOSTILITY HAS BEEN AROUSED BY INTERNATIONAL PUBLICITY CAUSED BY OUR EFFORTS TO SECURE INTELLIGENCE. THE U-2 SHOOT DOWN OVER THE USSR, THE SHELLING OF THE LIBERTY AND THE CAPTURE OF THE PUEBLO, THE FAIRLY NUMEROUS INCIDENTS OVER THE YEARS INVOLVING THE ARREST AND JAILING OF AGENT PER-

SONNEL, AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE FLAPS HAVE CAUSED

FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR NEWS MEDIA TO BECOME

PRETTY TWITCHY WHERE INTELLIGENCE MATTERS ARE CON
CERNED. THIS IS NOT TO POINT A FINGER OF FAULT, BUT

SIMPLY TO STATE A FACT OF LIFE.

THIS SENSITIVITY DOES NOT, HOWEVER, STEM FROM INTELLIGENCE INCIDENTS ALONE. THE COMMUNIST BLOC HAS EXPLOITED THESE EVENTS TO THE FULLEST THROUGH DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE AND PROPAGANDA CHARGES, AND LOCAL

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COMMUNIST ELEMENTS HAVE AGITATED A GREAT DEAL. THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF THE COMMUNIST STATES HAVE TRUMPED-UP CHARGES OF ESPIONAGE AGAINST INNOCENT WESTERN TOURISTS. THEY HAVE ALSO OBFUSCATED THE FACTS THROUGH A CAMPAIGN OF FORGERY AND VILIFICATION DIRECTED AGAINST U.S. INTELLIGENCE. CIA ESPECIALLY HAS BEEN THE TARGET OF THIS EFFORT IN THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES. WHETHER THE HOST GOVERNMENT ACTS FROM GREED, RESENTMENT OR HOSTILITY, OR IS SIMPLY UNABLE TO STAND THE HEAT OF OPPOSITION CRITICISM, THE RESULT IS THE SAME--THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT TURNS CHILLY.

THE ASSUMED UBIQUITOUS CHARACTER OF CIA IS
MOST HUMOROUSLY ILLUSTRATED BY A NEW YORKER CARTOON
OF SEVERAL YEARS PAST. THE CARTOON SHOWS A GROUP
OF NATIVES WATCHING A VOLCANO ERUPT. THE CAPTION
READS: "Pass it along. The CIA did it!"

FOREIGN SENSITIVITY TOWARD INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS ITS COUNTERPART WITHIN THE UNITED STATES.

IN ADDITION TO THE INCIDENTS MENTIONED ABOVE, YOU ARE ALL FAMILIAR WITH THE PUBLICITY GENERATED BY THE DISCLOSURE OF CIA SUPPORT TO U.S. STUDENT AND OTHER ACTIVITIES WHICH WERE DIRECTED AT OVERSEAS TARGETS.

THERE HAS BEEN A RASH OF SPY LITERATURE AND TELEVISION

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PROGRAMS. ALL THESE HAVE COMBINED TO SENSITIZE CERTAIN SECTORS OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES. MANY DOMESTIC CRITICS OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAVE DEVELOPED A KIND OF KNEE-JERK REACTION. THEY DO NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE PURPOSES OF INTELLIGENCE, AND THE GREAT CONTRIBUTION INTELLIGENCE MAKES TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY IMMEDIATELY RUSH TO BELIEVE THE WORST AND ISSUE FORTH WITH BLANKET CONDEMNATIONS.

PLEASE UNDERSTAND THAT I AM NOT TRYING TO MAINTAIN THAT MISTAKES HAVE NOT OCCURRED, OR THAT THE RISKS WE RUN HAVE NOT OCCASIONALLY BEEN MISCALCULATED. I AM SAYING THAT GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE CRITICS ALIKE SHOULD TRY TO BE OBJECTIVE AND TO KEEP THE EQUITIES—AS WELL AS THE OCCASIONAL DISADVANTAGES—IN MIND WHEN THEY DISCUSS THE SUBJECT. WE CAN HELP SOME BY CONDITIONING OUR PRIVATE ATTITUDES ALONG THAT SAME LINE.

ANOTHER FORM OF CRITICISM OFTEN PRODUCED BY
MAJOR INTERNATIONAL CRISES CONCERNS ACCUSATIONS OF
AN "INTELLIGENCE FAILURE." THE ERECTION OF THE
BERLIN WALL, WARS AND COUPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, THE DOMINICAN CRISIS, THE
RECENT TET OFFENSIVE AND MANY OTHER MAJOR EVENTS

-6-SECRET HAVE BEEN FOLLOWED BY CHARGES THAT U.S. INTELLIGENCE FAILED TO PROVIDE WARNINGS.

As you know, intelligence warning has, in fact, BEEN GIVEN PRIOR TO MANY, IF NOT MOST, OF THESE CRISES. PUTTING ASIDE THE PROBLEM OF WHETHER THESE CRITICS ARE WELL INFORMED, THE CHARGE OF FAILURE USUALLY STEMS FROM ONE OF TWO FACTORS. THE FIRST INVOLVES THE INTELLIGENCE WARNING ITSELF. JUST HOW PRECISE CAN INTELLIGENCE BE EXPECTED TO BE IN PRE-DICTING HOSTILE ACTIONS? OBVIOUSLY IT IS DESIRABLE THAT WE GIVE ADVANCE NOTICE OF EXACTLY THE WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, HOW AND WHY OF THE HOSTILE ACTION OR DEVELOP-MENT. THIS DEGREE OF PERFECTION HAS SELDOM HAPPENED IN THE HISTORY OF INTELLIGENCE. ONE BENDS EVERY EF-FORT TO GIVE THE POLICY MAKER THIS KIND OF WARNING, BUT ONLY RARELY IS IT POSSIBLE TO SO PENETRATE THE ENEMY'S PROTECTIVE BARRIERS TO PROVIDE A FULLY RE-LIABLE, DETAILED NOTICE IN ADVANCE OF THE PRECISE NATURE OF A HOSTILE ACTION.

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THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN IS THAT IN MANY CASES OF SO-CALLED FAILURES, WE HAVE PROVIDED INTELLIGENCE WARNINGS, BUT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT--FOR VARIOUS REASONS--HAS NOT BEEN IN A POSITION TO DO

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ANYTHING ABOUT IT. THE CONSTRAINTS OF TODAY'S WORLD SOMETIMES MAKE IT A LOSING PROPOSITION TO ACT ON WHAT WE KNOW. THIS IS CERTAINLY FRUSTRATING. BUT THE UNINFORMED CRITIC CONFUSES DISMAY, WHICH STEMS FROM OUR INABILITY TO ACT, WITH WHAT HE THEN CALLS "SURPRISE."

ANOTHER FACTOR WE MUST FACE IS THE CONSTANTLY IMPROVING SECURITY OF OUR PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE TARGETS. TO A CERTAIN EXTENT THIS IS THE OLD RACE, WELL KNOWN IN MILITARY MATTERS, BETWEEN THE OFFENSE AND THE DEFENSE AS IT APPLIES TO INTELLIGENCE. I AM SURE THAT YOU WHO WORK IN COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE ARE ESPECIALLY AWARE OF HOW NECESSARY IT IS TO KEEP INCREASING THE SOPHISTICATION OF OUR ATTACK ON FOREIGN COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS, IN ORDER TO OVERCOME ADVANCES IN THE COMMUNICATION SECURITY OF OUR TARGETS.

THE DEFENSIVE ABILITIES OF OUR MAIN TARGETS

SEEM TO GROW AS THE PRESENT LIMBO BETWEEN REAL PEACE

AND MAJOR WAR LENGTHENS OUT. DURING MILITARY HOSTILI
TIES, INTELLIGENCE OPPORTUNITIES TEND TO OPEN UP.

THIS IS CERTAINLY TRUE IN THE COMMUNICATION FIELD

WHEN MESSAGE VOLUME AND USE OF LESS-WELL-TRAINED

PERSONNEL GO UP, AND SECURITY SLACKENS.

THE SAME OBSERVATION APPLIES TO AGENT OPERATIONS.

VIGILANCE DOES HEIGHTEN IN TIME OF WAR. BUT THE UPROOTING OF LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE AND DIFFICULTY OF
COMMUNICATING IN WARTIME CAUSE HOSTILE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SERVICES TO FUNCTION LESS EFFECTIVELY.

As we leave World War II further behind, the SECURITY OF OUR INTELLIGENCE TARGETS BECOMES BETTER ORGANIZED AND MORE EFFECTIVE. As a result, ever MORE EXTENSIVE, COSTLY AND IMAGINATIVE EFFORTS ARE REQUIRED TO PENETRATE THE SECURITY BARRIERS AND TO PRODUCE HIGH LEVEL INTELLIGENCE RESULTS.

THE TRENDS I HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING SO FAR LARGELY CONCERN THE WORLD OUTSIDE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY--OUR INTELLIGENCE TARGETS, THIRD COUNTRY GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES, AND OUR CRITICS. LET US IDENTIFY A FEW TRENDS WITHIN THE PROFESSION ITSELF.

ALTHOUGH THE FUNDS EXPENDED AND THE PERSONNEL EMPLOYED IN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES ARE CLOSELY GUARDED, IT IS WELL UNDERSTOOD THAT BOTH HAVE BEEN STEADILY INCREASING FOR THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS. APART FROM INFLATIONARY PRESSURES AT HOME AND ABROAD, THERE ARE SEVERAL REASONS FOR THIS.

OBVIOUSLY, WITH SUCCESSIVE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PAY RAISES, OUR PERSONNEL COSTS ARE UP, AND THIS IS

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NO SMALL ITEM. BUT MORE IMPORTANT HAS BEEN THE DE-VELOPMENT OF TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCED SYSTEMS TO COLLECT AND EXPLOIT DATA OBTAINABLE BY SOPHISTICATED SENSORS. THE SYSTEMS ARE LARGE AND COSTLY, AND THEY REQUIRE HIGHLY SKILLED PERSONNEL. MANY OF THEM USE MOBILE PLATFORMS OR ARE DESIGNED FOR OPERATION IN UNUSUAL LOCATIONS. THEY OFTEN GOBBLE UP VAST QUANTI-TIES OF DATA WHICH REQUIRE EXPENSIVE EFFORTS FOR RE-DUCTION AND PROCESSING, BEFORE THE DATA BECOME USE-FUL TO INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS. THE DECISION TO DE-VELOP AND OPERATE ONE OF THESE SYSTEMS IS USUALLY

A "BIG" DECISION, INVOLVING

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH SYSTEMS IS ONE WAY TO OVERCOME SOME OF THE PROBLEMS I REFERRED TO EARLIER, SUCH AS THE IMPROVING SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLI-GENCE EFFORT OF OUR MAIN TARGETS, AND THE GROWING LIMITATIONS ON OUR USE OF THE TERRITORIES OF THIRD COUNTRIES. BUT THE IMPETUS TO OPERATE THESE SYSTEMS ALSO STEMS FROM OUR DESIRE TO PRODUCE BETTER INTELLI-GENCE FOR THE POLICY MAKER, THE OPERATIONS OFFICER AND THE FORCE PLANNER. TO DO THIS REQUIRES USING, AND MANY TIMES PUSHING, THE STATE-OF-THE-ART. AND TO DO SO IS COSTLY,

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ANOTHER STIMULUS TO THE EXPANSION OF INTELLI-GENCE STAFF AND BUDGETS IS THE GROWING INTEREST OF OUR POLICY MAKERS IN EVERY AREA OF THE WORLD. BEFORE 1960, THE SOVIET UNION WAS THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE. THE SOVIET UNION AND MORE RECENTLY, COMMUNIST CHINA, CONTINUE TO BE OUR NUMBER ONE TARGETS, BUT THE APPETITES OF OUR CONSUMERS OF INTEL-LIGENCE NOW EXTEND TO THE POLITICAL, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS OF ALMOST ANY COUNTRY YOU MAY CARE TO NAME. THEY ARE GETTING MORE VORACIOUS AS EACH CRISIS MOUNTS. THUS, IT HAS BECOME NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN AT LEAST A MINIMUM COLLECTION EFFORT AND ANALYTICAL EXPERTISE ON EACH AND EVERY OUT-OF-THE-WAY COUNTRY, AGAINST THE MOMENT WHEN IT MAY BE PRO-PELLED INTO THE HEADLINES THROUGH A COUP, A WAR, OR SOME OTHER NATIONAL UPHEAVAL.

THERE IS YET ANOTHER TREND AFFECTING US ALL AS A RESULT OF THE GROWING DOLLAR AND PERSONNEL COSTS OF INTELLIGENCE. I REFER HERE TO THE PRESSURES FOR ECONOMY IN INTELLIGENCE. THE CURRENT WAVE OF CUTTING PERSONNEL ABROAD IS ONE MANIFESTATION OF THIS. I AM SURE WE AGREE THAT EACH MEMBER AGENCY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS OCCASIONALLY SUNK A DRY HOLE

-11-SECRET AND MAY DO SO AGAIN IN THE FUTURE. BUT IN TODAY'S CLIMATE IT IS VITAL THAT WE ALL BE ECONOMY-MINDED. IN PARTICULAR, WE SHOULD WORK HARD TO ELIMINATE ACTIVITIES THAT ARE OUTMODED OR OF MARGINAL USE-FULNESS, JUST AS HARD AS WE ARE WILLING TO WORK TO ACHIEVE AN IMPORTANT NEW ADVANCE. GIVEN THE GROWTH OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE BUDGET, CERTAINLY THE ECONOMY TREND WILL CONTINUE TO BE WITH US.

Now, what about the fruits of our labor? The trend here is the most reassuring and satisfying of all. It is my considered judgment that our national intelligence stands at a level which has not been surpassed since World War II. Our intelligence product is good, and I am confident it will continue to improve. We do have gaps in information on some of our most important targets, and we should expect that this will continue to be the case. Occasionally our intelligence judgments are faulty. For that matter, looking back over the past year, we know that the intelligence analysts in Moscow have certainly suffered some major intelligence failures."

WHILE I AM ON THE SUBJECT OF THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT, LET ME GIVE YOU MY VIEWS ON THE OLD ARGUMENT

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AS TO WHAT IS "INTELLIGENCE" AND WHAT IS "INFORMATION." INFORMATION COMES FROM MANY SOURCES--U.S.

DIPLOMATS AND ATTACHES, AGENTS, RADIO BROADCASTS

AND NEWSPAPERS, OBSERVERS, AND PHOTOGRAPHY, AS WELL

AS FROM INTERCEPTED COMMUNICATIONS. IT IS, IN EFFECT, THE RAW STUFF OUT OF WHICH INTELLIGENCE IS

MADE. WHEN ALL THE AVAILABLE INFORMATION PERTINENT

TO A PROBLEM HAS BEEN EVALUATED AND ANAYLZED, THE

RESULTING PRODUCT IS FINISHED INTELLIGENCE. FINISHED

INTELLIGENCE SHOULD NOT REQUIRE THE DECISION-MAKER

TO ANALYZE FURTHER THE FACTS UPON WHICH IT IS BASED-
THE MEANING MAY SOMETIMES NOT BE CLEAR, BUT HE CAN

RELATE IT TO THE DECISION OR ACTION HE IS CONSIDER
ING, OR MAY BE FORCED TO CONSIDER.

How does it apply to communication\$ intelligence?

I would say that much COMINT falls in the category

of information.

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AUTHENTICITY OF THE COMINT, PER SE. IN THE FIRST CASE, THE RELIABILITY OF THE SUBSTANCE DEPENDS HEAVILY ON THE SKILL OF THE COMINT ANALYSTS WHO PUT THE REPORT TOGETHER. IN THE SECOND CASE, RELIABILITY IS APT TO RANGE FROM THE HORSE'S MOUTH AFT. IN BOTH CASES, FURTHER ANALYSIS MUST TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE FABRIC OF THE INTELLIGENCE TAPESTRY IS WOVEN.

BUT THERE ARE OTHER DECRYPTED MESSAGES IN WHICH THE RELIABILITY OF THE CONTENTS IS MANIFEST. AN

SPEAKING OF OUR INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT AS A WHOLE, WE HAVE SUFFICIENT FEEDBACK FROM TOP U.S. POLICY MAKERS TO KNOW THAT INTELLIGENCE IS PLAYING A ROLE OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE IN THEIR DECISION MAKING ON MANY OF THE MOST CRITICAL ISSUES FACING OUR GOVERNMENT TODAY. GENERAL CARTER, ALONG WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD, KNOWS HOW OFTEN

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KEY FIGURES IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMUNITY AND OUR DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT REQUEST USIB VIEWS ON A VARIETY OF SPECIAL SUBJECTS. THESE REQUESTS ARE FREQUENT, AND THEY BEAR ON MOST OF THE CRITICAL DECISIONS FACING OUR TOP LEADERS.

IN TAKING SATISFACTION IN THE PRESENT HIGH STATUS AND VALUE OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE EFFORT, I DO NOT MEAN TO SUGGEST THAT WE CAN AFFORD TO BE SMUG. A TRULY PROFESSIONAL GROUP AVOIDS THIS PITFALL, FOR AS HOLY WRIT HAS IT, "PRIDE GOETH BEFORE A FALL."

Nor can we in the different parts of the IntelLigence Community afford the shortsightedness of inDulging what I would call a "tribalistic" attitude
Of seeing only the problems or interests of one's
Immediate shop or agency. We must work hard to foster
A spirit of genuine cooperation, whereby we all see
Our problems in the context of the total effort of
the Intelligence Community. In a word, we need empathy
in our work If we hold to this approach, I am confident that the already recognized and still growing
value of the national intelligence effort will outweigh all of the other intelligence trends I have
Discussed with you today. You should count yourselves
major contributors.

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